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NEGLIGENCE-UST CLEAR CHANCE-PLAINTIFF'S IGNORANCE OF DANGER
WHEN HE Is NoT IGNORANT oF THE !NsTRuMENTALITY WHICH CAusEs H1s

INJURY-Plaintiff, a boy twelve years of age, was struck by a locomotive of
defendant railroad and suffered severe injuries. Defendant engineer, who had
noticed plaintiff walking toward the track, could have stopped the train when he
first observed plaintiff but did not because he had seen plaintiff look over his
shoulder at the approaching train. The train could not be stopped after plaintiff
had stepped onto the track. Plaintiff admitted seeing the train when it was 400
feet distant and that he had miscalculated the time necessary to cross in front
of it. On appeal from judgment against both defendants, held, affirmed. Application of last clear chance doctrine on ground that plaintiff was oblivious to his
danger was proper. Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., (Cal. App., 1949) 207 P.
(2d) 864.1
The doctrine of last clear chance was first applied to situations where plaintiff
had negligently gotten himself into a perilous position from which he could not
escape. 2 The defendant was held liable despite plainti!f's contributory negligence

1
2

Petition for hearing by Supreme Court dismissed.
Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546 (1842).
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if he thereafter had a clear chance to avoid the injury by using due care. Some
courts also apply the doctrine to situations where the plaintiff could escape but
is negligently unaware of his danger, if defendant knows of plaintiff's inatten·
tion.8 In the principal case, the plaintiff by his own admission knew of the
approach of the train but had simply miscalculated the time required to cross in
front of it4 It is doubtful whether he could be aware of a si~ation in fact and
not have an appreciation of the danger involved. Cases frequently arise where
the plaintiff looks but does not see the dangerous instrumentality approaching5
or where the plaintiff looks but miscalculates his chances of avoiding the danger.6
The problem generally arises in traffic accidents involving pedestrians where· it
is common for a pedestrian to miscalculate the speed of an approaching vehicle
or, after correctly calculating its speed, to cross in front of it hoping that the driver
will slow down once he sees a pedestrian in front of him. If the vehicle is far
enough distant when the plaintiff steps in front of it so that the driver has a clear
opportunity to avoid the accident by slowing down or turning aside, then obviously
the doctrine of last clear chance applies regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge of
the vehicle's approach. 7 In this type of case the plaintiff, due to his negligence
in miscalculating the danger, has placed himself in a position from which, because
he is on foot or in a slower vehicle, it is physically impossible for him to extricate
himself, and the defendant has a last clear chance to avoid the injury. Some of
the earlier California cases8 involving miscalculations on the part of the plaintiff
were necessarily decided on this basis since they arose before California permitted
the doctrine to be applied when the plaintiff was merely unaware of the danger.
When a case arose after this application of the doctrine was recognized where
the plaintiff had miscalculated the danger and had placed himself in a physically
inextricable position too late for the defendant to avoid the injury by slowing
down, the court would not permit the plaintiff to say that he was ignorant of the
s Cavanaugh v. Boston & Me. R. R., 76 N.H. 68, 79 A. 694 (1911); Locke v. Puget
Sound International Ry. & Power Co., 100 Wash. 432, 171 P. 242 (1918); Girdner v.
Union Oil of Calif., 216 Cal. 197, 13 P. (2d) 915 (1932); Moore v. Kum, 108 F. (2d)
906 (1939); Nielson v. Richman, 114 F. (2d) 343 (1940), cert. den. 311 U.S. 705, 61 S.Ct.
172 (1940); Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp., 155 F. (2d) 808 (1946). And see 11 C. J.,
Chance 280 (1917) and PROSSER, ToRTS §54 (1941), but cf. Middletown Truss Co. v.
Armour·& Co., 122 Conn. 615, 191 A. 532 (1937); Butler v. Rockland T. & C. St. Ry. Co.,
99 Me. 149, 58 A. 775 (1904). For a discussion of the doctrine as applied in California see
HALL, LAsT CLEAR CHANCE (1939).
4 Principal case at 869.
5 Colorado Springs & I. Ry. Co. v. Merrill, 27 Colo. App. 382, 149 P. 843 (1915);
Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal. 205, 13 P. (2d) 918 (1932); Middletown Truss Co.
v. Armour & Co., supra, note 3.
6 Commonwealth Bonding & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 42 Cal. App.
573, 184 P. 29 (1919); Galwey v. Pacific Auto Stages, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 169, 273 P.
866 (1929); Berguin v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 203 Cal. 116, 263 P. 220 (1928).
7 Jbid. Although in Galwey v. Pacific Auto Stages, Inc. the defendant's driver testified
that he did not see the plaintiff until it was too late to stop, the court thought there was
sufficient evidence controverting his testimony to justify an instruction based on the doctrine
of last clear chance.
S Jbid.

1950]

RECENT DECISIONS

717

danger and that the defendant should have realized this ignorance before the
plaintiff had gotten himself into a helpless position.9 In the principal case, since
the plaintiff stepped onto the track when the train was only fifteen feet
distant, the defendant had no last clear chance for avoiding the injury after the
plaintiff was in a physically inextricable position. Recovery was based solely
upon the defendant's opportunity to avoid the injury by realizing the plaintiff's
ignorance of the danger and by acting whi1e the plaintiff was still walking toward
the track. But at that time the plaintiff knew of the approach of the train and
was not in a position from which it was physically impossible for him to escape.
Moreover, the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's knowledge of the train's
approach.10 All the cases relied on as authority by the court, with the exception
of one case,11 involved plaintiffs who were unconscious of their peril because
they were totally unaware of the approach of the instrumentalities which caused
their injuries and not because they failed to analyze properly the situation in
which they found th~mselves. The principal case is probably explainable by the
youth of the plaintiff and the apparent ease with which the defendant could have
stopped the train, rather than by a proper application of the doctrine of last clear
chance as it has been heretofore applied. Extra caution exercised at a time when
plaintiff was still walking toward the track could have prevented the injury, and
the possible consequences of not using this extra caution were probably weighed
against the effort required to stop the train. Inasmuch as it seems to hold that
a plaintiff can be aware of the situation in fact and oblivious to the danger therein,
the principal case seems to be an extension of the doctrine of last clear chance
in California approaching a result of liability without fault.
John Yates
9Rasmussen v. Fresno Traction Co., 15 Cal. App. (2d) 356, 59 P. (2d) 617 (1936).
Plaintiff, the driver of an automobile, miscalculated the speed of an approaching street car
and erroneously estimated that he had time to cross in front of it. Defendant motorman
did not have time to stop his street car after plaintiff's automobile was on the track and since
plaintiff knew of the street car's approach, application of the doctrine of last clear chance
on the ground that he was unaware of his danger before he started to cross the track was
denied.
10 Upon sounding his whistle, he had seen the plaintiff look over his shoulder toward
the approaching train, hence his failure to apply the brakes initially was justifiable. Principal
case at 869.
11 Woods v. Kum, (Mo. App. 1944) 183 S.W. (2d) 852. But there the defendant
had a last clear chance to avoid the injury after the plaintiff had reached a physically inextricable position. Plaintiff had miscalculated the ~ d of an approaching train and
erroneously estimated that she had time to drive her truck across in front of it. Nevertheless,
recovery was permitted on the ground that defendant had an opportunity to avoid the injury
by slowing down sufficiently after plaintiff's car was on the track to permit plaintiff to
extricate herself.

